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Abstract

A progressively larger portion of social ordering occurs through mediation. Lawyers
are often involved in mediation. From one perspective, mediation is simply facilitated negotiation. Thus the issues that pervade the ethics of negotiation reappear
in the context of mediation without much change. Mediation, however, promises
much more than facilitated negotiation. “Transformative mediation”, now widely
practiced, aims not primarily at maximizing outcomes, but at the moral transformation of the parties. This form of mediation poses much more fundamental
questions about legal ethics and the lawyer’s role. These questions implicate the
general morality of legal and political discourse and the interrelationships of the
moral, legal, and political spheres.
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SOME ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING
MEDIATION
Robert P. Burns*
INTRODUCTION
A progressively larger portion of the activity of dispute resolution,
of social ordering,1 occurs through mediation. Mediation is now the
preferred method of “alternative dispute resolution,” or, as some of
its proponents, seeking to dislodge litigation from its position as the
default method of social ordering, like to put it, “appropriate dispute
resolution.”2 Large corporations have embraced mediation as a
method that offers the promise of cost savings as well as maintaining
the quality of the long-term relationships on which many businesses
depend.3 It is almost certainly true, however, that in the majority of
mediations, at least one of the participants, if not both, is a person of
modest means. Mediation through neighborhood justice centers or
community justice centers is available to address disputes among
neighbors. The largest employer in the United States sponsors an
ambitious mediation program to resolve disputes that arise in the
work place.4 Prosecutors and courts often refer minor, though often
potentially dangerous, criminal or juvenile matters to mediation.
Many jurisdictions encourage, or even require, mediation in the half
of American marriages that end in divorce. It is increasingly likely
that individual Americans will participate in mediation and it is thus
increasingly important that lawyers who represent individuals
consider seriously the ethical issues that such representation raises.
In this Essay, I first describe the two most important issues in the
ethics of negotiation and ask whether mediation conceived as
facilitated negotiation changes the appropriate resolution of those
*

Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. Lon Fuller, The Principles of Social Order 27 (1981).
2. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial
Lawyering, 27 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 153, 162 (1999).
3. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509, 536
(1994) (providing an economic interpretation of the increasing interest of
corporations in alternative dispute resolution).
4. Cynthia J. Hallberlin, Transforming Workplace Culture Through Mediation:
Lessons Learned from Swimming Upstream, 18 Hofstra Labor & Employment L.J.
375 (2001).
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issues. Then I shift to a different question, one raised by mediation’s
most robust claims, to be a mode of social ordering uniquely capable
of making participants better people, of occasioning moral growth.
Here I must employ a more philosophical idiom, to explore the terrain
surrounding the appropriate place of lawyers in “transformative
mediation.” I suggest that these very practical questions quickly open
out to more basic issues concerning what is and what is not possible
within the social structure that we have created for ourselves, a
structure in which the moral, political, and legal spheres have relative
independence from one another.
I.

TWO TRADITIONAL ISSUES IN NEGOTIATION ETHICS
A. The Question of Truthfulness

The most important ethical issues surrounding the mediations in
which lawyers participate relate to: (1) the appropriate level of
candor for the dialogue that occurs during the mediations and (2) the
appropriate division of authority between lawyer and client before
and during the mediations. These are the very same issues that
surround negotiation ethics, though the addition of the mediator
changes the context within which they arise.
At one extreme, mediation can simply be facilitated share
bargaining. Here the underlying premise of a mediation is that there
is a relatively fixed pie to divide and that the mediation is a “zero-sum
game.” One person’s gain is the other person’s loss and neither party
gains in any way from the other party’s “success.” The process of the
mediation, like share-bargaining negotiation, is employed both to
determine whether there is a zone of cooperative success, a so-called
bargaining range created by the overlap between the parties bottom
lines,5 and then to settle as close to the other party’s bottom line as
possible. The ethical issues surrounding this style of negotiation are
all intertwined with obligations of candor or truthfulness; and one can
easily see why. Both parties to this kind of negotiation perceive
themselves better off settling anywhere in the settlement range
created by the overlap between bottom lines than not settling.6 But,
both parties are conceived as solely self-interested and so each is
better off settling at the point in the settlement range that represents
precisely the “opponent’s” bottom line. From a purely self-interested
point of view, each party is best served by the opponent’s
5. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating To Create
Value In Deals and Disputes 18-21 (2000).
6. In the jargon, each party’s BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated
agreement) is perceived as worse than a negotiated settlement anywhere in the
settlement range. See Robert Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement
Without Giving In 97-106 (2d ed. 1991).
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misunderstanding the party’s own bottom line, believing that it is
identical to his own. So if a plaintiff will settle for $10,000 and a
defendant will offer as much as $20,000 to avoid further litigation, it is
in our purely self-interested plaintiff’s interest that the defendant
perceive that he will accept no less than $20,000. For it is still in the
interest of the defendant that he settle for $20,000 rather than go to
trial. The process of this sort of negotiation involves “information
bargaining” to discover the opponent’s bottom line, while
convincingly sequencing offers and engaging in other behaviors, of
which the negotiation literature offers a full panoply, to convince the
opponent that the bottom line is other than where it actually is.
The obvious way to avoid this morally distasteful, if sometimes
subtle, dance of deception, or at least misdirection, is simply to be
utterly candid about the underlying facts of one’s own situation as well
as one’s bottom line. Indeed, full candor would not involve simply
answering questions posed by one’s negotiating partner honestly. It
would involve volunteering all information that each party would like
to know. Such candor would suggest the apparently courteous
expedient of splitting the difference between the bottom lines,
something that would seem to provide “equal respect” to the
participants. Of course, splitting the difference is dependent on a high
level of candor from each side, candor that is inconsistent with our
assumption of the mutual indifference of the parties and cannot
practically be guaranteed by the usual means of incentives and
penalties.
Even assuming that such candor could be achieved, the moral
appeal of splitting the difference is largely illusory. What determines
each party’s bottom line is his aversion to the best alternative to a
negotiated settlement. That aversion may stem from a range of
particular circumstances of which my negotiating partner has no moral
right to take advantage. Assume that I will sell my house for $100,000
today because I need that money today to make a necessary down
payment for needed surgery for my child. I normally would not
consider a penny under $130,000. Assume a buyer is willing to pay
$140,000 since all equivalent houses cost $145,000. Is it morally right
for a buyer to learn of my exigencies and then benefit from them,
something that splitting the difference and agreeing to the $120,000
would implicitly do? I would surely believe that my peculiar needs
ought not in any way to determine the price I get from the sale.
The ethical and legal rules that control this sort of negotiation try to
balance the ideals of “telling the truth” and “preventing the
negotiating partner from taking advantage.” Because these are
incommensurable values, we have a range of different sorts of rules
striking slightly different balances in different jurisdictions. The
continuum of candor here runs from:
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(1) complete candor, including disclosure of the negotiator’s bottom
line and his analysis of his Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement; to
(2) full disclosure of all interests, wants, needs, and negotiating
vulnerabilities; to
(3) full disclosure of all the facts of the situation, of which the
negotiator is fairly certain his negotiating partner is unaware and of
which that partner is likely to be interested; to
(4) disclosure only of those interests and needs where the possibility
of collaborative bargaining to achieve a “bigger pie” outweighs the
dangers of being “taken advantage of”; to
(5) answering specific questions about issues of fact candidly and
fully, but not volunteering information as in (3); to
(6) seeking to avoid answering specific questions of fact, which
reveal needs and desires (“blocking”), but refusing to make a false
statement of material fact; to
(7) failing to correct the opponent’s misunderstandings of fact or
law that favor one’s position, while remaining scrupulous about not
affirming or endorsing the misunderstanding; to
(8) actively misleading the opponent as to one’s bottom line and
one’s eagerness to settle by (a) false statements about such
“immaterial” facts and (b) other negotiating behaviors, such as the
sequencing and timing of offers; to
(9) active misrepresentations as to fact and law that are likely to
result in settling closer to one’s opponent’s bottom line.
Although there exist in some jurisdictions authority that the line is
drawn in a more demanding way in specific contexts,7 current norms
forbid clearly only the last and do not require any of the more candid
behaviors described in numbers (1) to (5).
A good deal of the “technique” of negotiation as it is generally
taught in law schools and in professional education programs involves
“information bargaining” designed to reveal as much as possible
about the opponent’s situation and positions. This involves asking
direct questions and listening carefully to the answer or for
“blocking”8 attempts that often reveal that a negotiator feels morally
7. Specifically there are a few cases where lawyers have been disciplined for
failing to disclose particularly significant facts in negotiation. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar
Ass’n v. Geisler, 938 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1997) (unethical for lawyer to settle case
without disclosing client’s death to opponent); ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-397 (1995) (same); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar
Ass’n v. Addison, 412 N.W. 2d 855 (Neb. 1987) (finding that lawyer negotiating with
hospital on client’s behalf had an obligation to inform hospital of insurance that was a
potential source of payment). It is very difficult to identify the principle that emerges
from these cases, though they certainly set the norm for specific factual contexts in the
relevant jurisdiction.
8. The relative ineffectiveness of “blocking” that is not supplemented by actively
misleading the negotiating partner is one of the reasons that negotiators subjectively
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constrained not to lie but does not want to reveal what the opponent
can then assume to be an answer that suggests a more favorable
bottom line. Of course, more skeptical negotiators do not assume that
their opponents feel constrained even by the minimal norm expressed
by number (9), and will be alert to determine whether or not that
opponent is willing to lie outright about matters of fact.
The current lawyer codes strike the following balance along this
continuum.9 There is generally no requirement that a lawyer inform a
negotiating partner of any fact,10 however clear it is that the negotiator
would want to know that fact, would profit from knowing it, or suffers
from major misunderstanding of that fact. In that sense, they are
wholly coherent with the share bargaining style of negotiating
described above. Current rules impose some limits on a purely
strategic style by prohibiting “false statement[s] of material fact or
law”11 to opponents. Practically, that limits strategic misdirection
solely to “agenda setting” that avoids whole areas that contain factual
material of which the negotiator seeks to avoid discussion and
“blocking” of specific inquiries. Both these “techniques” are to some
extent learnable, though their effective use seems largely a matter of
the force of personality of the negotiator.
The complexity and ambiguity of the authoritative interpretations
of the Rule shows the depth of the tensions among the competing
moral considerations here. The Comment to Model Rule 4.1 provides
some consolation to the hard bargainer: “A lawyer is required to be
truthful when dealing with others on a client’s behalf, but generally
has no affirmative duty to inform an opposing party of relevant
facts.”12 The exception to the exception, however, can create
situations that call for extraordinarily, if not impossibly, refined
judgments: “A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates
or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is
false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act.”13 The
Comment to the Ethics 2000 Commission version of Comment 1 to
Rule 4.1 drops the extremely unhelpful last phrase “failure to act,” but
substitutes language that may not be more helpful in resolving
individual cases: “Misrepresentations can also occur by . . . partially
true but misleading statements or omissions that are the equivalent of
affirmative false statements.”14
feel that it is almost “unfair” to impose the relatively undemanding current standard
of truthfulness in arms-length negotiations.
9. The literature on this question is already quite large. For useful analyses, see
Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiation, 75 Iowa L. Rev. 1219 (1990)
and Geoffrey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1987).
10. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 cmt. 1 (1999) .
11. R. 4.1(a).
12. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
13. Id.
14. ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 4.1 cmt. 1, at http://www.abanet.org/
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The Comment to the current version of the Model Rules goes on to
incorporate language that has caused a fair degree of consternation:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular
statement should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the
circumstances.
Under generally accepted conventions in
negotiation, certain types of statements ordinarily are not taken as
statements of material fact. Estimates of price or value placed on
the subject of a transaction and a party’s intentions as to an
acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the
existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of
the principal would constitute fraud.15

Other than the examples provided by the Comment, there seems to be
one other major category of statements that would be outside the
confines of “material fact,” namely the willingness of a client to go to
trial rather than reach a settlement. Assume, for example, an
observant Christian whose child has been injured in an automobile
accident and who believes that actually going to trial is inconsistent
with his religious beliefs. Assume on the other side of this dispute a
publicly held insurance company with a highly rationalized internal
structure which takes a purely instrumental maximizing attitude
toward its claims adjustment, justified in their minds by their legally
defined first obligation toward their stockholders. I believe that most
lawyers would take the view that the client’s attitude toward
settlement is not a “material fact” as to which the opponent is entitled
to truthfulness.
Thus, one of the reasons that the ABA and the states that have
enacted versions of Rule 4.1 have been so minimalist in imposing
obligations of truthfulness is the moral ambiguity of truthfulness as an
ideal in the context of share bargaining. A second reason is the
difficulty in enforcing a rigorous rule and the strategic benefit to be
derived by all of those likely to be privy to the knowledge that a
lawyer has not been candid, namely that “community of two,” lawyer
and client. Liberal law is limited practically by its ability to actually
create the incentives that achieve a high level of conformity. It is true
that cloaking a norm with the authority of law will likely increase the
level of conformity to that norm. But especially in competitive
contexts where information about violations is hard to come by, law
may be strictly limited in what it can accomplish. My own experience
suggests that lawyers find it extremely difficult to even conform to the
limited obligations that the current rules impose. Absent a sea change
in lawyers’ sensibilities in these matters—one that powerful trends in
law practice make less, not more, likely—and even putting aside the
moral ambiguity of absolute candor in all negotiation situations,
cpr/e2k-rule41.html.
15. R. 4.1 cmt. 2.
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raising the bar on candor may well confirm an additional advantage
on those least deserving of it.16
This extremely strategic attitude toward truth-telling, doling out bits
of information often out of context, may get in the way of “problem
solving” or “integrative” styles of negotiation and the “broad
facilitative” style of mediation that parallel it. Problem solving is
normally thought to require a higher level of candor between
negotiating partners. This is because a key aspect of the problemsolving enterprise is to separate positions taken for the kinds of
strategic reasons just described from the underlying interests or
“needs” that animate the parties. Purely positional bargaining may
blind both parties to the negotiation of possibilities for collaboration
(ways that “enlarge the pie” for distribution). To give an extreme
example, one of the classic strategic ploys is “br’er rabbit,” where the
negotiator insists that one outcome (that he secretly desires above all)
is the most disfavored of all outcomes. If the opponent wants him to
submit to that outcome, the opponent is going to have to pay a very
high price indeed. From a problem-solving point of view, however,
the use of such a ploy may well prevent the negotiating partner from
proposing alternatives that provide even more of the secretly desired
alternative.
Problem-solving negotiation is often a strategic choice. Indeed the
fundamental ethical ambiguity of Getting to Yes and its considerable
progeny is the spirit within which a negotiator chooses the principle
that should control the so-called principled negotiation that is thought
more appropriate for problem solving. There is no consideration
offered in that book that makes the choice of principle anything other
than strategic. In the classic negotiation between roommates who are
a trumpeter and a flutist about the rules that should control their
common life, the trumpeter’s advocacy of “individual freedom to play
whenever we want” can be no less self-interested for being fully
principled.
B. The Question of Client Authority
The other set of ethical issues that surround negotiation have to do
with the fostering of client autonomy. Specifically, they involve the

16. The Comment to Rule 4.1 in the Ethics 2000 Commission’s version adds the
following sentence: “Lawyers should be mindful of their obligations under applicable
law to avoid criminal and tortious misrepresentation.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm.,
supra note 14, Proposed R. 4.1 cmt. 2. The last phrase should remind the lawyer that
his obligations of truthfulness are not exhausted by the ethical rules that control
negotiation, but may be controlled by the laws of tort and fraud. Furthermore, since
certain kinds of misrepresentations, or even failures to disclose, may prevent the
meeting of the minds required for a binding contract, including the contract
embedded in the consensual settlement of a case, a lawyer may be guilty of
malpractice by a failure of candor that provides the basis for avoiding the agreement.
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interpretation of Model Rule 1.2, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall
abide by a client’s decision concerning the objectives of
representation . . . and shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued.”17 The Rule provides explicitly that a
lawyer “shall abide by a client’s decision whether to accept an offer of

17. R. 1.2(a). The Ethics 2000 recommendations change the relevant language to
read “[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of
representation . . . and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R.
1.2(a), at, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule12.html.
The Ethics 2000
recommendations would also somewhat expand Rule 1.4, which mandates reasonable
communication with the client, to require that a lawyer “reasonably consult with the
client about the means by which the client’s objectives are to be accomplished.” ABA
Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.4(a)(2), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2krule14.html. Though the change seems insignificant, at least one commentator has
worried that moving the provision to a Rule that addresses communication (Rule 1.4),
rather than the division of authority (Rule 1.2), may expand the lawyer’s discretion as
to the choice of means. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Professional Rules and ADR: Control
of Alternative Dispute Resolution Under the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposal
and Other Professional Responsibility Standards, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 895, 908
(2001). The Comment to the new Rule 1.4 provides as follows:
[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client
about the means to be used to accomplish the client’s objectives. In some
situations—depending on both the importance of the action under
consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client—this duty will
require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as
during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the
situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such
cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of
action the lawyer has taken on the client’s behalf.
ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.4 cmt. 3, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2krule14.html.
The current Model Rules provide a demanding definition of consultation:
“‘Consult’ or ‘consultation’ denotes communication of information reasonably
sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question.”
Model Rules of Prof’l Responsibility, Terminology.
The Ethics 2000
recommendations do not define consultation. In the new scheme of the Ethics 2000
recommendations, it is significant that a lawyer’s choice of means do not require what
is a defined term, “informed consent.” (“‘Informed consent’ denotes the
agreement . . . to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm.,
Proposed R. 1.0(e), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule10.html). Nor does the
Comment to either Rule 1.2 or 1.4 in the recommendations contain the following
language now contained in the Comment to Rule 1.2:
A clear distinction between objectives and means sometimes cannot be
drawn, and in many cases the client-lawyer relationship partakes of a joint
undertaking. In questions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility
for technical and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding
such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected.
R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
The new ALI Law Governing Lawyers is clearer that the client holds ultimate
authority with regard to means. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers
§ 21(2) (2000).
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settlement of a matter.”18 This provision includes as an obvious
corollary a requirement that a lawyer convey to the client any offer
concerning which the lawyer does not already have clear authority to
accept or reject.
Two sorts of difficulties arise in the application of this rule. The
first has to do with the choice in negotiating strategy itself. Is the
decision to pursue a hard positional bargaining strategy or an
integrative or problem-solving approach a choice of means or a choice
of the goals of the representation? It seems that it could be either.19
If the client’s goals in the representation are solely extrinsic to the
process—maximizing recovery in a tort claim—it would seem that
choice of negotiating style would be a means. If the client includes
maintaining cordial relations with the opposing party as a goal of the
representation, it would still seem that the choice of negotiating
strategy is a means rather than an end, though here the choice of an
integrative strategy might be the only competent20 one. One could,
however, envision a client who saw it as a goal of the representation to
communicate with the negotiating party in a candid and nonmanipulative manner, even if that surrendered some tactical
advantages. Such a client would consider integrative bargaining to be
a matter of ethics, not of strategy. In a Kantian idiom, he might say
not that honesty is the best policy, but that honesty is better than any
policy. For such a client, negotiating in a certain manner could well
become a goal of the representation on which, according to the
casuistry suggested by Rule 1.2, the client holds ultimate authority.21
We will return to this subject when I consider the promise of certain
forms of mediation to be intrinsically superior to adversary forms of
dispute resolution and the role that a lawyer might have in mediation
so conceived.22
The second set of problems surrounding the application of the rule
are practical. In lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation, the attorneys face a
shifting set of proposals in an indeterminate relationship to each
other.
Often one’s opponent23 is offering trade-offs between
possibilities, each precise combination cannot easily be anticipated
and the movement from one to the other may be fluid. Withdrawal
18. R. 1.2(a).
19. The Comment to Rule 1.2 notes that the distinction between ends and means
is at best provisional and sometimes decidedly unhelpful. R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
20. R. 1.1 (noting that a lawyer shall provide competent representation).
21. Of course, if the lawyer regards such a course of action “repugnant or
imprudent,” the lawyer would traditionally have the right to withdraw. R. 1.16(b)(3).
I would hope that few lawyers would consider integrative bargaining to be repugnant,
though I would imagine some would think it imprudent in one or another set of
circumstances.
22. See infra Part III.
23. I use this term here with full knowledge that it is problematic. For an
integrative negotiator, the negotiating partner should not be conceived as an
“opponent.”
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from the negotiation to consult with the client every time a slight
modification is tentatively proposed may be impractical and, from a
purely strategic point of view, may reveal aspects of the client’s
position that ought to be withheld. I do not think there is any easy
answer to this practical problem, though its force can be blunted by
good initial client interviewing and a firm sense of the priorities
among the client’s goals.
The second difficulty in the application of the rule requiring client
control of the goals of representation in negotiation is more a problem
in the lawyer’s moral psychology.24 In lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation
the attorney largely controls the pattern of offers from the opponent
and completely controls the flow of information to the client. The
client is dependent on the lawyer’s reporting of the opponent’s factual
assertions and the offers made. More importantly, the client is
dependent upon his lawyer’s judgment about what resolutions are
feasible and when the opponent has reached his resistance point.
When a lawyer says to his or her client, this point is “non-negotiable”
or “they will not budge on this,” it is likely that the client will follow
his lead. Finally, the ethical rules all but prevent a lawyer from
contacting a represented opposing party when he or she believes that
offers (and, a fortiori, information) are not being conveyed to that
party by his or her lawyer.25
The client is thus highly dependent upon the lawyer’s honesty—
primarily with himself26—about what he is saying to his client and
what he is doing in the negotiation. And there are strong motives to
be less than candid with oneself. Often a lawyer will honestly believe
that his client is not acting in her own best interests, that she is too
willing to settle on unfavorable terms in a divorce, perhaps, simply to
avoid even the threat of a trial that the lawyer believes is extremely
remote. The temptation to resort to the paternalistic manipulation of
information here can be great. Second, every fee structure will create
some potential conflict of interest27 between client and lawyer. This is
true whether the lawyer is charging a flat fee, an hourly fee, or a
24. Several of the essays in The Good Lawyer: Lawyer’s Roles and Lawyers’
Ethics (David Luban ed., 1983), address the importance of considering a lawyer’s
dispositions and moral psychology.
25. The Model Rules do not absolutely prohibit client-to-client contact under
these circumstances but there is a risk here that a lawyer will be accused of
orchestrating an improper end-run around the lawyer representing the opposing
party. See, e.g., Trumbull County Bar Ass’n v. Makridis, 671 N.E.2d 31 (Ohio 1996).
26. On self-deception as a particularly deadly sin, see Hannah Arendt, Between
Past and Future 227, 254 (1968).
27. The phrase “conflict of interest” is not exactly apposite here. For the lawyer’s
obligation is not to pursue his or her client’s “interests,” as the lawyer perceives them,
but his client’s stated goals in the representation. A good lawyer will surely try to
ensure, through the counseling process, that the client’s genuine interests are
considered, but the client’s goals, not his interests, should be the standard of the legal
representation.
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contingent fee. In each case, it is a matter of purely contingent fact
that the lawyer’s financial self-interest will be exactly congruent with
his client’s goals in the representation. Only the lawyer’s sense of
professional obligation—his or her “purity of heart”—can assure that
it is the client’s goals that are being advanced.28
II. THE IRRELEVANCE OF MOST FORMS OF MEDIATION TO THE
LAWYER’S OBLIGATIONS
Broadly speaking mediation is the practice through which a third
party engages in a conversation seeking resolution of a situation that
the parties find problematic. This description has to be so generic
because the forms of mediation and the styles of mediation have
become so diverse. Though I cannot provide even the barest outline
of the varying goals and methods of mediation, some description may
be helpful as a background for a discussion of specific ethical issues
that arise in this context and for my concluding discussion of the
particularly interesting ethical issues surrounding one form of
mediation: so-called “transformative mediation.”
The primary organization of dispute resolution professionals in the
United States has described alternative dispute resolution’s
“conflicting values and goals, including:
1.

increased disputant participation and control of
the process and outcome;

2.

restoration of relationships;

3.

increased efficiency of the judicial system and
lowered costs;

4.

preservation of social order and stability;

5.

maximization of joint gains;

6.

fair process;

7.

fair and stable outcomes; and

8.

social justice.”29

Given that range of possible goals, it should come as no surprise
that mediators employ a broad range of methods, some of which are
28. We try to dramatize both threats to the client’s autonomy in a simulated
negotiation exercise in Robert P. Burns et al., Exercises and Problems in Professional
Responsibility 35-36 (2d ed. 2001).
29. Ensuring Competence and Quality in Dispute Resolution Practice, Report 2
of the SPIDR Commission on Qualifications 5 [Soc’y of Prof’ls in Dispute
Resolution] (1995) (emphasis added), quoted in Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 Harv.
Negot. L. Rev. 7, 17 n.34 (1996).
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inconsistent with those possible goals that a particular mediator (1)
does not recognize as legitimate or important, (2) does not think
appropriate for the particular dispute,30 or (3) must subordinate to
other goals placed higher on the mediator’s hierarchy of values.
The most prominent divide between mediator styles is between socalled facilitative mediation and evaluative mediation.31 In facilitative
mediation, the mediator takes a purely maieutic role, striving to be the
midwife of solutions that the parties themselves propose.32 In
evaluative mediation, a mediator is willing to offer his own solutions,
to offer his own judgments about the workability or wisdom of the
solutions proposed by the parties, or, at the extreme, to offer what
seems to the mediator to be the best resolution of the problematic
situation.33 Facilitative mediators place mediator “neutrality” high on
their hierarchy of values and so are more willing to aid in the
identification of solutions that are attractive to the parties, but about
which they may have serious doubts, especially on fairness grounds.34
Two problems beset facilitative mediators: (1) the problem of power
and information imbalances between the parties which may lead to
unfair agreements and (2) the practical elusiveness of true or
complete neutrality in the conduct of the mediation. By contrast,
evaluative mediators struggle with questions about the sources of their
authority to “impose” their own values on the participants, especially
because the parties usually do not give informed consent for
evaluative mediation.35 If the evaluative mediator in a litigated or
potentially litigated case offers his judgment of the appropriate terms
of the settlement based on his own estimates of the likely outcome at
trial, he faces empirical questions about his predictive capacities. The
latter is especially problematic in those cases where the parties are
30. The question of the particular kinds of problematic situations appropriate for
mediation has been one of the most fundamental questions in the field. The seminal
work remains Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. Cal. L. Rev.
305 (1971); see also Robert P. Burns, The Appropriateness of Mediation: A Case Study
and Reflection on Fuller and Fiss, 4 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 129 (1989).
31. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A
Discussion, 24 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 919 (1997); Riskin, supra note 29.
32. Riskin, supra note 29, at 24.
33. Id. at 23-24.
34. It seems that facilitative mediators have fewer qualms about exploring the
workability or practicality of the solutions offered by the parties than they do about
addressing its fairness.
35. “‘Informed consent’ denotes the agreement . . . to a proposed course of
conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation
about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed
course of conduct.” ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.0(e), at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/e2k-rule10.html. The discussions among proponents of mediation can
become quite polemic. See, e.g., Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative”
Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 Alternatives to High Cost Litig. 31 (1996); Lela P.
Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 Fla. St. L. Rev.
937 (1997).
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attempting to take full advantage of mediation by resorting to it early
in the case before formal discovery is complete.36 The disagreements
among mediators as to the appropriate style of mediation can be
intense.37
Insofar as mediation is facilitated negotiation, the parties may adopt
either of the negotiating styles already described in the course of a
mediation. Indeed, some of the strongest proponents of mediation as
a method of dispute resolution have recently expressed their dismay
at the appearance of all the ploys and methods of distributive
bargaining in the context of mediation.38 For there are many reasons
why a lawyer who is intent upon engaging in hard bargaining of the
chilliest sort may still opt for mediation. A mediator, through the
effective use of caucuses (separate meetings with individual parties),
may diffuse the interpersonal hostility that may cause one or more
parties to act “irrationally,” that is, to refuse to settle even though
settlement may be in their interest. Even if the parties have no
interest in integrative bargaining, a mediator who speaks to each side
separately under protections of confidentiality may notice
opportunities for “enlarging the pie” to which the parties were
oblivious. Sometimes a lawyer may correctly believe that his
opponent overestimates the value of his case, measured by likely
outcomes if the case goes to trial, and the likelihood a settlement will
be enhanced by the mediator’s “reality testing,” that is, providing his
evaluation of the case or even asking probing questions of the
opponent. Sometimes a lawyer may believe that the lawyer with
whom he may negotiate lacks the credibility with his own client to
counsel that client to accept a resolution that really is in the client’s
interest. And sometimes a lawyer may admit to lacking a similar
credibility with his own client. So it is surely possible that a lawyer
convinced of the wisdom of a hard bargaining style will still opt for
mediation. Perhaps more significantly, given the prevalence of
mandatory mediation in a large number of court systems, a share
bargainer by choice or instinct may find himself in a mediation he or
she did not choose.
One author, himself an extremely reflective mediator of deep
experience, has summarized the essential practices in which a good
mediator engages:

36. See James S. Kakalik et al., An Evaluation of Mediation and Early Neutral
Evaluation Under The Civil Justice Reform Act 44 (1996) (describing the problems
that arise from referrals to mediation too early in a case).
37. Professor Riskin notes as well that mediators (or mediation programs) may
choose to define the problem either “broadly” or “narrowly.” Thus, there are four
quadrants on his mediation grid: Evaluative-Narrow, Facilitative-Narrow, EvaluativeBroad, and Facilitative-Broad. Riskin, supra note 29, at 25.
38. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
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Stated simply, the mediator has three basic strategies that operate in
a continuing iterative cycle during the course of a mediation:
gathering information, interpretation and diagnosis, and
encouraging movement. In carrying out the first two strategies the
mediator uses active listening and intuitive and rational thinking
skills. For those two strategies to be effective, the parties must share
with the mediator as much relevant information as possible
regarding the source and status of the dispute and suggested
proposals for resolution. In carrying out the third strategy—the
movement strategy—the mediator typically uses a variety of tactics
that may be categorized under three headings: communication,
substantive, and procedural.39

Even without a fuller description of the methods of a good
mediator,40 one can see how the very same issues of candor that arise
in negotiation inevitably arise in mediation. Indeed, Cooley counsels
an advocate to listen carefully to what a mediator says about his
negotiating partner’s beliefs and positions to discern telling verbal
clues of those beliefs and positions that his partner would prefer to
hide.41 He counsels as well that an effective advocate in mediation
should begin with a high reasonable offer supported by reasons, move
off that initial offer only with several supporting reasons, “hold back
some information favorable to you or unfavorable to the opposing
side until the final caucuses,”42 and be careful not to reveal one’s
bottom line to the mediator early in the mediation.43 In other words,
the very same methods of positional bargaining, strategically
“principled”44 negotiation, and information bargaining that a share
bargainer might use with an opponent, can effectively be used with a
mediator.
The narrow ethical issue this raises is the level of candor which a
lawyer owes to a mediator. The mediator is surely entitled to that
degree of candor required by Rule 4.1. But, the latter is heavily
qualified in the ways we have discussed above. The remaining
question is whether the mediator is entitled to a higher level of
candor—specifically, whether a mediator is entitled to the protection
of Rule 3.3, which provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;

39. John W. Cooley, Mediation Advocacy 114 (1996).
40. Id. at 117-19 (discussing strategies for effective mediation).
41. Id. at 118.
42. Id. at 121.
43. Id. at 116-23.
44. “Principled” in the sense advanced by Fisher and Ury: the use of a potentially
strategically chosen principle to slow the movement off a position. Fisher et al., supra
note 6, at 10-14.
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(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
...
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has
offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the
lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.45

The Model Rules do not provide a definition of a “tribunal.” The
Ethics 2000 recommendations remedy this omission in a way that is, I
think, consistent with the current rules:
RULE 1.0: TERMINOLOGY
(m) “Tribunal” denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding
arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency
or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body,
administrative agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity
when a neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal
argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal judgment
directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular matter.46

It is clear that mediation would not fall under this definition of
“tribunal.” Indeed, it almost seems that the definition has been
written carefully to exclude mediation from its scope.47 It appears
then, that the same ethical obligations concerning candor that apply
when negotiating with an “opposing party” apply to statements to the
mediator. Although the case could be made that a party owes a
higher level of candor particularly to an “evaluative” mediator than to
an opposing party, I know of no authority so holding.
Does positional or integrative negotiation within the context of
mediation change the ethical terrain concerning a lawyer’s obligation
to defer to the client’s setting of goals for the representation and
consulting on means?48 I think not, though the participation of the
45. Model Rules of Prof’l Responsibility R. 3.3 (1999).
46. ABA Ethics 2000 Comm., Proposed R. 1.0(m), at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/
e2k-rule10.html.
47.The Annotated Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct note that:
Although the term ‘tribunal’ is not defined in the Terminology section of the
Rules, or in Rule 3.3 or its Comment, the context in which the term is used
in the Rules makes clear that ‘tribunal’ refers to a trial-type proceeding in
which witnesses are questioned, evidence is presented, the parties and their
counsel participate fully, and the decision is rendered by a fact finder. Cf.
ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Op. 93-375 (1993)
(noting that disclosure provisions of Rule 3.3 do not apply to
nonadjudicative proceedings, such as routine examinations by bank
regulatory agency).
Ctr. on Prof’l Responsibility, Annotated Model Rules Of Prof’l Conduct 316 (4th ed.
1999)
48. Shortly, I will argue that a different form of mediation, transformative
mediation or mediation as moral dialogue, raises more basic questions of legal ethics.
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client in most forms of mediation may well reduce, though not
eliminate, the dangers implicit in the lawyer’s control of the flow of
dialogue in negotiation and in the dependence of the client on the
lawyer for information about the settlement process. Otherwise the
issues surrounding client authority in the process of mediation remain
much the same.49
III. BASIC LAWYERING STYLES AND THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION
Many of those writers most dismayed50 at the transplantation of the
tools of hard bargaining into the world of mediation have urged that
the genius of mediation is its ability to enhance integrative or
problem-solving approaches to dispute resolution. And much of the
proposed attraction of mediation for some of its proponents is the
possibility it offers to transform lawyers from hired guns to “problemsolvers” who “add value” to transactions and disputes by integrative
methods.51 This style of mediation is not fundamentally different from
See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
49. There has been some discussion of whether a lawyer is obliged to present the
possibility of mediation to a client who would otherwise pursue litigation (or
negotiation) and then defer to the client’s decision. The most complete treatment
concludes that current Rules would have to change in order to impose such an
obligation, a change that the author urges. See Cochran, supra note 17, at 897; but see
Va. Code Ann. R. pt. 6 § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (Michie 2001). The Virginia Comment adds
the following sentence to the Comment in the Model Rules: “In that context, a lawyer
shall advise the client about the advantages, disadvantages, and availability of dispute
resolution processes that might be appropriate in pursuing these objectives.”
Cochran, supra note 17, at 902-03 (quoting Va. Code Ann. R. pt. 6 § II, R. 1.2 cmt. 1).
50. A federal magistrate judge, Wayne Brazil, has described the following range
of behaviors among lawyers participating in court-annexed mediation:
[P]ressing arguments known or suspected to specious, concealing significant
information, obscuring weaknesses, attempting to divert the attention of
other parties away from the main analytical or evidentiary chance,
misleading others about the existence or persuasive power of evidence not
yet formally presented (e.g., projected testimony from percipient or expert
witnesses), resisting well-made suggestions, intentionally injecting hostility
or friction into the process, remaining rigidly attached to positions not
sincerely held, delaying other parties’ access to information, or needlessly
protracting the proceedings—simply to gain time, or to wear down the other
parties or to increase their cost burdens.
Wayne D. Brazil, Continuing the Conversation about the Current Status and the Future
of ADR: A View from the Courts, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 11, 29 (2000), quoted in
Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer
Ethics for Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem
Solving: Mediation, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 935, 945 (2001). Judge Brazil has also
described the appearance of courses like “How to Win in ADR” and “Successful
Advocacy Strategies for Mediations.” Id. Carrie Menkel-Meadow recounts the story
of one lawyer who threatened a potential opponent, “I am filing an ADR against
you!” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative Dispute Resolution: New Issues,
No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers’ Responsibilities, 38 S. Tex. L.
Rev. 407, 408 n.1 (1997).
51. See, e.g., Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create
Value In Deals and Disputes (2000).
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integrative bargaining, though it may well profit from the presence of
an imaginative and perceptive mediator who knows how to enhance
the communication between the parties. Once again, problem-solvers
can be strategic and self-interested, though it is an enlightened selfinterest to which they appeal.52 This is not in any way to denigrate the
importance of a fully competent attorney’s understanding of the
situational advantages of the problem-solving style.
To my mind, however, the most challenging set of ethical questions
surrounding lawyers’ participation in mediation concerns the
possibility and extent of a lawyer’s participation in so-called
transformative mediation. I have concluded above that the specific
ethical issues that surround mediation as facilitated arms-length
negotiation are really no different from those that surround such
negotiation engaged in without a mediator’s intervention. Nor is the
ethical terrain surrounding mediation any different when it occurs in
the so-called “problem-solving mode” that takes place for the usually
assumed self-interested reasons.
It is the existence of so called “transformative mediation” that
poses the greatest challenge to the American lawyer’s “standard
philosophical map.”53 I will argue below that such mediation is
discontinuous with the ways in which American lawyers generally
conceive of their roles and counsel their clients.54 By contrast,
transformative mediation is strangely coherent with a style of
lawyering that Professor Thomas Schaffer has described eloquently
and at some length and calls “moral discourse.”55 That style of
lawyering and transformative mediation are both attempts to
transcend a kind of instrumental rationality dominant in many spheres
of American life. It is that style that proponents of transformational
mediation and proponents of lawyering as moral discourse see as
preventing the realization of basic human good; they prevent the
realization of moral sources.56 I will argue that the dominant style of
legal counseling makes it very difficult for a client to realize the
benefits of transformative mediation. On the other hand, the style of
lawyering that Shaffer urges makes it very easy to realize those
benefits. The challenge for such a lawyering style is to protect a client
against its dangers.
52. See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc., 696 P.2d 645, 656 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, J.,
concurring) (“An attorney should explain to the client the strategic considerations
that determine whether a jury trial or some other form of dispute resolution should be
utilized.” (emphasis added)), quoted in Cochran, supra note 17, at 912.
53. Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 Ohio St. L.J. 29, 43-48, 57-59
(1982).
54. See infra notes 80-84.
55. Thomas L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral
Responsibility 113-34 (1994).
56. On the concept of a moral source, see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The
Making of the Modern Identity (1989).
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Those who speak of the “genius of mediation” or the “magic of
mediation” or, in the words of the seminal work on the subject,57 “the
promise of mediation,” are often speaking of so-called
“transformative mediation.”
The twin goals of transformative
mediation are mutual recognition and empowerment. The authors
who use this term are trying to capture something of the experience of
moral destiny that occurs during mediation, the felt certainty that the
parties are moving beyond their day-to-day selves in the course of the
process and realizing aspects of their respective selves that usually
remain dormant. Put simply, many mediators and authors are
convinced that this kind of mediation regularly makes the participants
better people.58
There have been different and quite varying attempts to provide a
philosophical explanation or justification for this kind of mediation.
One can be skeptical about any one explanation while remaining
sympathetic to the basic perception that something extraordinary,
something substantial,59 occurs in the course of some mediations.
And, in fact, the limited or partial capacity of any one explanation
may well be an indication of the richness of what can occur. One
author invokes Girard’s notion of the creation of a sacred space
cleared by individuals’ witnessing of the mutual victimization of each
party and becoming consciously identified with the universal norms
violated in that kind of victimization.60 Other authors find this
perceived richness in its felt congruence with a kind of post-modern
“relational” society toward which we are groping and which is neither
an individualist liberal society nor a pre-modern organic society.61
A simpler and more traditional explanation is that
“transformational” mediation is itself a form of distinctively moral
discourse. Moral discourse may always have been out of the ordinary,
because most people have always related to each other in more
primitive or instrumental ways. Or there may be something to
Alasdair MacIntyre’s view that modern market societies are so woven
with instrumental rationality that we barely remember the moral point
of view and the modes of moral conversation.62
57. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, The Promise of Mediation:
Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and Recognition 81-112 (1994).
58. This is precisely the claim Shaffer makes for the form of client counseling that
he endorses. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
59. The word invokes Hegel’s notion of “ethical substance,” the norms that are
already realized and embedded in the institutions and practices of a society. See
Charles Taylor, Hegel 365-88 (1975).
60. See Sara Cobb, Creating Sacred Space: Toward a Second-Generation Dispute
Resolution Practice, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1017, 1022 (2001).
61. Bush & Folger, supra note 57, at 244.
62. MacIntyre has described the difference between a characteristically twentiethcentury understanding of the moral world and traditional understandings this way:
[E]motivism entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between
manipulative and non-manipulative social relations. Consider the contrast
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The center of gravity of authentically moral discourse is the
conversation between an agent and one who is actually or potentially
adversely affected by his actions.63 Moral conversation places actions
into a traditional moral vocabulary that is enormously rich and which
willy-nilly forms an important part of the identity of the speakers.64
That vocabulary allows for a range of verbal actions: denials,
justifications, and excuses among them. Moral conversation provides
a way of
healing tears in the fabric of relationship and of maintaining the self
in opposition to itself or others. . . . [I]t provides a door through
which someone, alienated or in danger of alienation from another
through his action, can return by the offering and the acceptance of
explanation, excuses and justifications, or by the respect one human
being will show another who sees and can accept the responsibility
for a position which he himself would not adopt.65

Moral conversation need not actually achieve agreement, though the
possibility of agreement animates the enterprise. “The point of moral
argument is not agreement on a conclusion, but successful [not
strategic] clarification of two people’s positions.”66
Its function is to make the positions of the various protagonists
clear—to themselves and to the others. Moral discourse is about
what was done, how it is to be understood and assessed, what
between, for example, Kantian ethics and emotivism on this point. For
Kant—and a parallel point could be made about many earlier moral
philosophers—the difference between a human relationship uninformed by
morality and one so informed is precisely the difference between one in
which each person treats the other primarily as means to his or her ends and
one in which each treats the other as an end. To treat someone else as an
end is to offer them what I take to be good reasons for acting in one way
rather than another, but to leave it to them to evaluate those reasons. It is to
be unwilling to influence another except by reasons which that other he or
she judges to be good. It is to appeal to impersonal criteria of the validity of
which each rational agent must be his or her own judge. By contrast, to treat
someone else as a means is to seek to make him or her an instrument of my
purposes by adducing whatever influences or consideration will in fact be
effective in this or that occasion. The generalisations of the sociology and
psychology of persuasion are what I shall need to guide me, not the
standards of a normative rationality.
Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue 22-23 (1981).
63. Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice 150 (1972).
64. As John Austin put it in a famous essay:
[O]ur common stock of words embodies all the distinctions men have found
worth drawing, an all the connexions [sic] they have found worth making, in
the life time of many generations: these surely are likely to be more
numerous, more sound, since they have stood up to the long test of the
survival of the fittest, and more subtle, at least in all ordinary and reasonably
practical matters, than any that you or I are likely to think up in our
armchairs of an afternoon—the most favored alternative method.
John Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc’y 1, 8 (1956).
65. Pitkin, supra note 63, at 151-52.
66. Id. at 153.
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position each is taking toward it and thereby toward the other, and
hence what each is like and what their future relations will be like.
The hope, of course, is for reconciliation, but the test of validity in
moral discourse will not be reconciliation but truthful revelation of
self. . . .
Moral discourse is useful, is necessary, because the truths it can
reveal are by no means obvious. Our responsibilities, the extensions
of our cares and commitments, and the implications of our conduct,
are not obvious . . . the self is not obvious to the self.67

We have other important ways of speaking on matters of moment.68
Moral conversation has a different tone and characteristics than do
other important forms of conversation in which we engage and which
are constitutive of important forms of life that we regard as legitimate.
Most significantly, it is unlike forms of political dialogue and legal
discourse.
There are two competing understandings of what constitutes
“political” discourse. I use “political” here in the ordinary language
sense in that many different institutions, private and public, have their
The perhaps dominant interest group, liberal70
“politics.”69
understanding of politics, conceives it as “a tale of dominance and
power, in which political institutions serve to protect the interests and
property of some men against the rest; or a tale of mutual
accommodation among essentially separate, private individuals or
groups, each with its own needs or interests, its own claims against the
others.”71 Within that understanding, speech in political contexts will
tend to be manipulative rhetoric, guided by the psychology of
persuasion, much as share bargaining conceives of negotiation. There
is a competing republican or deliberative understanding of political
speech, where deliberation is “neither just manipulative propaganda,
nor just a moral concern with the cares and commitments of another
person, but something like an addressing of diverse others in terms
which relate their separate, plural interests to their common
But, this too, is
enterprise, to a shared, public interest.”72
discontinuous with moral conversation.
Nor, of course, is legal discourse identical with moral conversation
in Pitkin’s distinctive sense. Legal discourse is at least in part

67. Id. at 153-54.
68. In a previous article, Burns, supra note 30, I tried to demonstrate concretely
the ways in which the parties to a mediation may move in and out of the different
linguistic realms that correspond to different spheres of human interaction,
specifically the moral, legal, and political.
69. George Kateb, Hannah Arendt: Politics, Conscience, Evil 7 (1984) (arguing
that genuine politics exists in many nongovernmental contexts).
70. See Theodore Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2d ed. 1979).
71. Pitkin, supra note 63, at 211.
72. Id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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“formalistic.” Metaphors of “construction” that invoke “craft” are
likely to be the most illuminating here. Much of legal discourse, in
different ways at different levels, involves the fitting of a particular
situation within a structure of authoritative categories while subtly
modifying those categories to accommodate new situations. We need
this worldly legal structure to maintain our distance from one
another—Arendt talks about the importance of the legal system in
maintaining the “hedges” between men73—and so to maintain our
freedom. (Totalitarian regimes press us up against each other to the
point where we cannot speak and act freely.)74 Speech within that
structure has a kind of generality and impersonality that is
discontinuous with moral speech in the sense that I have described.
Much of it involves maintaining “positions” that are determined by
the operative legal categories. Speakers wear masks and speak from
behind them.75
All this is a fancy way of saying that people do, and think they
should, talk differently in different contexts. “Moral” is an analogous
term, and that speech within the political realm, the legal realm, the
market, and what we normally call the “moral” sphere (that
controlling face-to-face interpersonal relations) can in that analogous
sense be “moral.” This is true even though the distinctive languages
and spirits of these spheres are, as we have seen, quite different. This
is true even if the legal world and the economic world are in one sense
“artificial,” even “mechanical.”76
Almost everyone accepts some version of this view. Very few
persons believe that all political and legal discourse is wrong.77 But
philosophical questions surrounding the appropriate relationships
among these realms abound. One set of questions surround the
flexibility of the boundaries within the spheres: whether there is a
political dimension to law or a moral dimension to politics, for
example, and if so, how should we understand these relationships.
There is another set of problems concerning the extent to which the
legal and political are always second best, a concession of the darkness
of the human heart and so always to be avoided if possible. Further,
views exist that there is a single line of “progress” by which one of the
spheres “colonizes” or “should colonize” the others. For some,
“progress” involves the extension of the market at the expense of the
73. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism 429-39 (1951).
74. See id. at 376-98.
75. See John Noonan, The Persons and Masks of The Law: Cardozo, Holmes,
Jefferson, and Wythe and Makers of the Masks (1976).
76. John MacMurray, Persons in Relation 153 (1961) (noting that the personal
world depends on artificial, not organic, structures).
77. The exceptions tend to be radical antinomian forms of Christianity for whom
life within the kingdom of God precludes interacting in legal or political contexts. It
is not surprising that such forms of Christianity find mediation a peculiarly
appropriate form of dispute resolution.
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political sphere, or vice-versa, or the gradual withering away or
qualification of strict market relations by modes of human interaction
controlled by moral norms in the narrower sense, a sense in which
there is a relatively lower level of purely instrumental interaction.
The reader will recognize the contemporary exponents of each of
these views and the visions of the human good that underlie them.
Lawyers’ professional identities seem closely wound up with
political and legal discourse. After all, if there were no political and
legal worlds, there would be no lawyers. What place do lawyers have
in moral discourse, and therefore in transformative mediation? I have
argued that the distinctive training and, much more importantly, the
distinctive experience of a lawyer, particularly a litigator,78 inclines
lawyers to a tone-deafness to the language spoken in distinctively
moral conversations.79 On the other hand, that same training and
experience make lawyers sensitive to the distortions and corruption of
those kinds of conversations. The central question concerns what
lawyers may contribute to a situation that can be resolved through
moral conversation. Is the lawyer’s function to stand on the sidelines
here and consistently remind his or her client of the dangers of moral
conversation, of the dangers of being manipulated, however subtly, by
someone who is playing by different rules? Is the lawyer to be a
partisan of political and legal discourse over moral discourse?
Of course, there is no one American lawyering style.80 It seems to
me, though, that the dominant style among lawyers who are selfconscious about their role is first to enhance the client’s autonomy, the
client’s effective freedom. This self-understanding is dominant in the
most widely used texts in interviewing and counseling.81 It is shared
by lawyers from varied practice backgrounds.82 The lawyer’s role here
78. See William F. Coyne Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 Ohio St. J. on
Disp. Resol. 367 (1999) (suggesting that litigators should not be involved at the
settlement stage); James E. McGuire, Why Litigators Should Use Settlement Counsel,
18 Alternatives to the High Cost of Litig. 107 (2000);.
79. See Robert P. Burns, A Lawyer’s Truth: Notes for a Moral Philosophy of
Litigation Practice, 3 J. L. & Relig. 229, 252-63 (1985).
80. Thomas Schaffer has identified four approaches to legal representation:
lawyer as godfather; lawyer as hired gun; lawyer as guru; and lawyer as friend. The
godfather style is dominant among advocates and stresses the lawyer’s real power to
achieve a stylized view of the client’s interest. The guru style is an older, nobless
oblige of the “gentleman lawyer,” who makes moral decisions for the client in a
paternalistic manner. The other styles are discussed in the text. Shaffer & Cochran,
supra note 55, at 5-52.
81. See, Robert M. Bastress & Joseph D. Harbaugh, Interviewing, Counseling,
and Negotiating: Skills for Effective Representation (1990); David A. Binder et al.,
Lawyers as Counselors: A Client-Centered Approach (1991); David A. Binder &
Susan C. Price, Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach
(1977).
82. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 Yale L.J. 1060 (1976); Steven Wexler, Practicing Law
for Poor People, 79 Yale L.J. 1049 (1970); see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

BURNSBP

11/12/01 8:28 PM

2001] ETHICAL ISSUES SURROUNDING MEDIATION

713

is to help the client realize, and in some versions to maximize, his
satisfactions through the use, perhaps the manipulation, of a
somewhat alien legal system. The counseling function follows a
competent fact interview that allows the lawyer to ascertain how the
legal system will likely categorize the situation and therefore the
probabilities of achieving one or another of the client’s possible
objectives.83 In counseling, the lawyer seeks to identify the client’s
goals and then to help the client weigh the advantages and
disadvantages, as measured by the client’s own goals, of each possible
course of action.
Although proponents of “client-centered
counseling” disagree about the precise place of the lawyer’s own
moral judgments in the process,84 the overwhelming thrust of this
lawyering style is to realize the client’s preexistent goals through the
devices of the legal system. As Edward Dauer and Arthur Leff put it
more dramatically:
The client comes to a lawyer to be aided when he feels he is being
treated, or wishes to treat someone else, not as a whole other
person, but (at least in part) as a threat or hindrance to the client’s
satisfaction in life. The client has fallen, or wishes to thrust someone
else, into the impersonal hands of a just and angry bureaucracy.
When one desires help in those processes whereby and wherein
people are treated as means and not as ends, then one comes to
lawyers, to us.85

How would such a lawyer treat the proposal that a client engage in
mediation? He would weigh the probability that mediation was more
or less likely to achieve the client’s satisfactions, as determined in the
course of a lawyer-client conversation in which the lawyer was seeking
to identify the client’s goals, as determined by the client’s
predetermined values. And, of course, it is possible that facilitative or
evaluative mediation in which the lawyer negotiated using positional
or problem-solving methods could do just that.
How would a client-centered lawyer consider that option and advise
his or her client? Particularly, how would a lawyer understand what
he or she is doing if transformative mediation really is equivalent to
what we understand to be simply moral discourse? This places the
client-centered lawyer in a strange position. His task is to counsel the
client as to whether mediation is likely to be the method by which he
will best realize his interests or satisfactions. However, transformative
mediation, genuine moral dialogue, may well place a client in a

Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 Am. B.
Found. Res. J. 613 (1986) (offering justification for lawyer’s amoral ethical role).
83. Of course, this can be done only in a preliminary way in a first interview.
84. See Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 19-27.
85. Edward A. Dauer & Arthur Leff, Correspondence: The Lawyer as Friend, 86
Yale L.J. 573, 581 (1977), quoted in Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 18.
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situation where he is likely to relinquish his ability to achieve his
interests. How should we understand this paradox?
A distinctively modern philosophical position is that the moral
point of view, with its traditional vocabulary, and its root commitment
to non-instrumental speech, is a matter of choice. In its classical
expression, it is a choice between subjecting oneself to traditional
moral norms and to the non-instrumental speech that accompanies
those norms, on the one hand, and a way of life that involves the
freedom, that is to say, “autonomy,” to pursue satisfaction as it
appears to the individual, on the other. When the modern lawyer
helps the client decide whether he wants to engage in transformative
mediation, he is engaged in a kind of distinctively modern
conversation. And, some would argue that it is an incoherent
conversation, because morality cannot be a matter of choice—it
imposes its obligations categorically.86 The very practices of clientcentered counseling are inconsistent with an understanding of
mediation as moral discourse. The moral point of view has a kind of
absoluteness.87 You cannot weigh acting morally, speaking morally in
this case, against other possible satisfactions. The problem of the
relation between client-centered lawyering and transformative
mediation is clear: you can’t get there from here.
The situation for Shaffer’s understanding of legal counseling seems
just the opposite. Transformative mediation is completely continuous
with client counseling as moral dialogue. And so, the problem is how
to avoid or escape from transformative mediation in those cases where
it is inappropriate, where the situation should be treated “politically”
or legally. Shaffer recommends his style of client counseling in the
following terms:
The client-centered counselors suggest that after identifying the
alternatives, the lawyer and client consider the advantages and
disadvantages to the client of each alternative. Under their model,
effects on others are considered only if they might affect the client.
We suggest that the lawyer and the client list the likely effects on
others as factors with independent significance. This may convey to
clients that they should consider the interests of others as well as the
interests of clients, but we think that is a good thing to convey.
Some might say that the lawyer here is “imposing his or her morals”
on the client. But we think that the lawyer is only pointing to
reality—and effects on others if a real part of the law office
decision.88

Shaffer suggests that the conversation between the lawyer and the
client itself be a kind of moral conversation. He suggests that the
lawyer articulate the reasonable perspectives of others with whom the
86. See Macintyre, supra note 62, at 39-45.
87. Burns, supra note 79, at 240-43.
88. Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 120 (footnote omitted).
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client has his or her problems and resist the easy instinct to become a
single-minded partisan of the client’s self-absorbed perspective. He
suggests further that the lawyer should “introduce moral judgment as
a legitimate objective,”89 while being careful not to “make . . . a just
resolution of the dispute and then impose it on clients.”90
If clients are to fully participate in decisions, and experience the
moral development that we feel is an important part of the attorneyclient relationship (or the autonomy that others feel is at the heart of
it), lawyers must be careful not to announce and insist on their
perception of justice. (Lawyers often have enough power to do
that.) The client must be a partner.91

It can be no surprise that mediation is a natural way to continue,
this time with the persons with whom the client has his problem, the
very dialogue that the lawyer has initiated with his client.
Transformative mediation easily develops out of Shaffer’s notion of
lawyer-client moral dialogue. In fact, in the extended example Shaffer
offers of what that kind of dialogue would look like, he suggests that
mediation would be the form of dispute resolution that can continue
that very moral dialogue.
What further role does the lawyer committed to moral dialogue
have once he or she and the client have decided that they want to
resolve their dispute through the further moral dialogue that
mediation provides? Transformative mediation seems to require that
the client himself participate in the mediation.92 It seems to me that a
89. Id. at 126.
90. Id.
91. Id. (emphasis added). This sort of dialogue is consistent with the notion of
moral judgment that Shaffer borrows from philosopher Gerald Postema:
Judgment is neither a matter of simply applying general rules to particular
cases nor a matter of mere intuition. It is a complex faculty, difficult to
characterize, in which general principles or values and the particularities of
the case both play important roles. The principles or values provide a
framework within which to work and a target at which to aim. But they do
not determine decisions. Instead, we rely on our judgment to achieve a
coherence among the conflicting values which is sensitive to the particular
circumstances. Judgment thus involves the ability to take a comprehensive
view of the values and concerns at stake, based on one’s experience and
knowledge of the world. And this involves awareness of the full range of
shared experience, beliefs, relations, and expectations within which these
values and concerns have significance.
Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 63,
68 (1980). For a similar notion of the complexity of moral decision-making, see
Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and
Philosophy 69 (1986). Shaffer provides a more detailed description of what these
kinds of conversations would look like. Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 55, at 119-34.
92. John Cooley’s advice to advocates involved in mediation seems to suggest that
the decision to allow the client to speak extensively in the mediation process is
normally a strategic decision. See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79
Minn. L. Rev. 1317 (1995).
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lawyer could be a participant in the kind of moral dialogue that
transformative mediation promises, though it surely will require a
kind of imagination and dialogue that contrasts sharply with the kind
required by litigation. Experience will, of course, be a much better
guide than logic here, as to whether lawyer involvement is consistent
with the central moral goals of this important form of mediation.
Further, even Bush and Folger recognize that not all problematic
situations are appropriate for mediation and it may often be true that
a decision about appropriateness cannot really be made until after the
mediation has commenced. Indeed their argument for a style of
mediation that is sharply distinctive presupposes the existence of
other institutions—courts, for example—that function through
different languages and with different priorities. Can the lawyer
committed to Shaffer’s vision of legal counseling and mediation as
moral dialogue act as a kind of bridge between the moral realm and
the more public worlds of law and politics?
Historically, American lawyers, even those who were committed to
a style of law practice far less strictly instrumental than those currently
dominant, have viewed themselves as somewhat world-weary figures
standing against the dangers of “enthusiasm,” perhaps especially
religious enthusiasm.93 Some clients are naïve. Many poor and
working class Americans have their disputes with highly rationalized
bureaucracies represented by lawyers who practice in a highly
instrumental style.94 Many of those lawyers could hardly imagine any
other style of resolving disputes. And there may be ranges of disputes
where individual moral dialogue is simply an inappropriate mode of
social ordering, while others are appropriate, even morally
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Is there a legitimate function for a lawyer committed to the primacy
of moral dialogue to provide the escape routes for a client engaged in
a moral dialogue in a mediation where that kind of dialogue proves
impossible or goes bad? Is it possible for a lawyer to protect his client
without constantly whispering in his ear during mediation that his
interests are in danger, without undermining exactly what this kind of
mediation may accomplish? Even if moral dialogue is generally the
best path, it is not always the best path. Even if it should be given
every chance, it is sometimes not available. A lawyer is usually
someone who knows the legal, political, and bureaucratic worlds

93. Perry Miller, The Life of the Mind in America From the Revolution to the
Civil War 15-18 (1965).
94. See, e.g., Peter Robinson, Contending with Wolves in Sheep’s Clothing: A
Cautiously Cooperative Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 Baylor L. Rev. 963
(1998).
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better than most individual clients of modest means. His task is to put
this knowledge to the service of clients without imposing a style of
purely instrumental thinking and speaking that may make clients
worse. The only real certainty is that the interpersonal and legal skills
necessary to fulfill this role are extremely subtle.
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